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Since the systematic study of many-valued logics began in earnest early in the 20th
century, many-valued logics have received their fair share of scrutiny. One topic that arises often
concerns the fact that the set of formulas validated by many-valued systems, and the inferences
sanctioned by such systems, tend to differ substantially from those of classical logic (with some
commentators viewing this as a virtue, some as a vice). One issue that does not seem to have
been addressed, however, is the source of these differences between classical logic and manyvalued logics.
My main interest in this paper is with this issue, that is, with the source of the differences
between many-valued and classical logic with respect to the set of valid formulas and inferences
sanctioned. In particular, I am interested in the question of whether such differences are inherent
in many-valued systems. And if the differences are not inherent, then what is the source? The
main focus of the current paper is on answering these two questions.
Many-valued logics are most often presented as semantic systems. I too take a semantic
approach. I begin, in Section One, with a brief discussion of some of the differences between the
set of formulas validated by classical semantics and those validated by the many-valued systems
presented to date. I likewise discuss the differences between the inferences sanctioned by
classical and many-valued semantics. In Section Two I turn to the question of whether the
differences stem from the plurality of truth-values. The answer is negative: I show, in Section
Two, that it is straightforward to construct a many-valued semantics validating all and only the
classical truths, and sanctioning exactly the same inferences as classical semantics. Thus,
whatever the source of the differences in the set of valid formulas and inferences sanctioned, they
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cannot stem simply from the plurality of truth-values. In Section Three I provide a brief
discussion of the semantics presented in Section Two, and then in Section Four I turn to the
second of my questions. In this section we identify the source of the differences, and Section
Five then extends the results to take into account considerations unique to infinite-valued
systems.

Section One: Classical and Many-Valued Truths and Inferences

There are a variety of ways to present many-valued semantics. For convenience, I will
take the essential elements of a semantics to be (i) models consisting of specifications of
domains, valuations on those domains, ranges of truth-values, and ranges of designated values,
and (ii) a specification of truth-conditions.
Whereas in two-valued semantics a valid formula is one that always takes the value 1,
there are, in many-valued semantics, some decisions to be made as to what shall count as valid. It
is common to consider the "favored" truth-values, that is, those used to determine validity in the
way that 1 is used in classical semantics, as designated values. The decision as to which values
are to be considered designated is generally made by the author of the semantics, with the two
most common choices being, on the one hand, just the value 1, and on the other hand, any value
at least as great as .5.
The notion of designated values makes it straightforward to define many-valued
counterparts of the usual semantic notions. A formula will be considered valid just in case it
takes a designated value under every model, and a many-valued semantics will be said to retain
classical logic just in case that semantic's valid formulas are exactly the classically valid
formulas. A model satisfies a formula iff that formula receives a designated value under the
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model, and a model simultaneously satisfies a set of formulas

just in case, under that model,

every member of the set receives a designated value. We shall say that a set of formulas
implies a formula A under a model M just in case M simultaneously satisfies
and that

semantically implies A iff

and satisfies A,

implies A under every model. Finally, a semantics S will

be said to retain the classical theory of deducibility just in case whenever a set of formulas
semantically implies a formula A under classical semantics, then

semantically implies A under

S, and vice versa.
Which values are taken as designated will, of course, affect which formulas are valid and
which formulas are semantically implied by which sets of formulas (or, loosely speaking, which
inferences are sanctioned by the semantics). These issues–the valid formulas (or lack thereof)
and inferences sanctioned (or not sanctioned) by the various many-valued semantics–are central
to the issue in which I am interested. The many-valued systems presented to date differ from
classical logic in the set of valid formulas, the inferences sanctioned, or both.
Consider first the case in which 1 is taken as the only designated value. Then some of the
better-known many-valued semantics–for example, Bochvar's internal system, Kleene's weak
system, Kleene's strong system, and others–fail to validate even P  P. In general, where 1 is
taken as the only designated value, none of the many-valued semantics studied to date retain
classical logic.1
As a brief aside, the failure to retain classical logic is not, of course, necessarily a
problem. These systems are often motivated by a feeling that not all of the classically valid
formulas should be retained. Considerations about future contingents, vague predicates, quantum
mechanics, and so on, have led some to the view that certain classically valid formulas–for
example, excluded middle–ought not to be retained. But such systems tend to lose even formulas
such as P  P. And it seems difficult to justify, on any interpretation of '', a failure to validate P
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 P. At the very least, the loss of such formulas is a noteworthy difference between these systems
and classical logic.
The above discussion assumed that the designated values included only the value 1. To
see the other side of the coin, consider the other common choice for the range of designated
values, in which all values greater than or equal to .5 are taken as designated. In this scenario, a
number of many-valued systems will validate the full range of classical truths. Such systems,
however, typically fail to retain the classical theory of deducibility. Again, it is not necessarily a
problem that such many-valued systems fail to sanction every classically-acceptable inference.
But it is noteworthy that such systems fail to respect inferences that seemingly ought to be
sanctioned. For example, consider the semantic analog of modus ponens, in which
= {P  Q, P}. Classically, of course,

semantically implies Q, and intuitively, this seems

right, even in many-valued contexts. But again, in many of the better-known systems, including
Bochvar's internal system, Kleene's strong system, Kleene's weak system, Slupecki's (1946)
system, and a range of others,

no longer semantically implies Q. In general, where values other

than 1 are taken as designated, the many-valued systems studied to date fail to retain the classical
theory of deducibility. And again, this is a noteworthy difference between such systems and
classical logic.
As noted, my main interest is in investigating whether such differences are inherent in
many-valued systems, and if not, then what is the source of such differences. In the next section,
we look at whether it is possible to construct a many-valued system that retains both classical
logic and the classical theory of deducibility. The idea, of course, is that if a many-valued system
can be constructed that retains both, then clearly the sorts of differences discussed in this section
cannot be inherent in many-valued semantics.
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Section Two: An Alternative Many-Valued Semantics

Let MV semantics consist of the set of MV models, where an MV model is a four-tuple
D,Q,Tru,Des. In such a model, D is a non-empty domain and Q a valuation on that domain,
subject to the conditions described below. Tru is the set of truth-values for the model. We require
that Tru be finite and, as is usual, that {0,1} I Tru I [0,1]. (The reason for requiring that Tru be
finite is discussed in Section Five.) Des is the set of designated truth-values for the model, which
we specify to be those truth-values at least as great as .5, that is, Des = {x x  Tru and x  .5}.
As is generally the case with many-valued semantics, the truth-conditions for the
connectives are normal, that is, they agree with the classical assignments whenever the truthvalues are restricted to 0 and 1. A typical first-order language is presumed, the language having
an infinite set T of terms, an infinite stock of variables, a two-place predicate symbol =, for each
n  0 a (possibly empty) set Pn of n-place predicate letters, and symbols v, &, , ~, }, ~, ), and (.

Conditions on Valuations: In an MV model D,Q,Tru,Des, the function Q is subject to
the following conditions:
(i)

for each d  D, d = Q(t) for some t  T

(ii)

for each t  T, Q(t)  D

(iii)

for each P  P0, Q(P)  Tru

(iv)

for each P  Pn (n  1), Q(P)  {5 5 : Dn  Tru}

6

Truth Conditions: The truth-value A

m

of a formula A under an MV model M is given

by the following clauses:
= 1 if Q(s) = Q(t); s = t

(i)

for s, t  T, s = t

(ii)

for P  P0, P

(iii)

for P  Pn and t1,...,tn  T, Pt1...tn

m

~A

= 1 if A

(v)

AvB

(vi)

A&B

m

(vii)

AB

m

= min{1, 1 - ( A

AB

m

= B

m

= 0 otherwise

= Q(P)

m

(iv)

m

m

m

< .5; ~A

m

= max{ A

m

, B m}

= min{ A

m

, B m}

m

m

m

= Q(P)(Q(t1),...,Q(tn))

= 0 otherwise

- B m)} if B

m

 .5 or A

m

< .5;

otherwise

(viii)

~xA[x]

m

= min{ A[t]

m

t  T}

(ix)

}xA[x]

m

= max{ A[t]

m

t  T}

Where a formula A receives a designated value under an MV model M, we write ¸m A;
where A receives a designated value under every member of a set S of MV models, we write ¸s A;
where A is valid under MV semantics, that is, A receives a designated value under every MV
model, we write ¸mv A; and where A is classically valid we write ¸c A. Likewise, where a set of
formulas

implies A under an MV model M, we write

under MV semantics, we write
semantics, we write

¸c A.

¸mv A; and where

¸m A; where

semantically implies A

semantically implies A under classical
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Lemma: Where TV is the set of MV models for which Tru = {0,1}, ¸c A @ ¸tv A.
Proof: Since the truth-conditions for MV semantics are normal, it follows immediately
that ¸c A @ ¸tv A.

Proposition 1: ¸c A @ ¸mv A.
Proof: Suppose ¸c A and, for reductio, that mv
/̧ A. Then for some MV model M =
D,Q,Tru,Des, /̧m A. Then A

m

< .5. Let M* = D,Q*,{0,1},{1} be an MV model where

Q* is such that (i) for each t  T, Q*(t) = Q(t), (ii) for each P  P0, Q*(P) = 1 if Q(P)  .5,
and Q*(P) = 0 otherwise, and (iii) for each P  Pn and t1,...,tn  T, Q*(P) = 5, where
5:Dn  {0,1} is such that 5(Q*(t1),...,Q*(tn)) = 1 if Q(P)(Q(t1),...,Q(tn))  .5, and
5(Q*(t1),...,Q*(tn)) = 0 otherwise. A straightforward induction on the complexity of
formulas shows that A

m*

=0@ A

m

< .5. So A

m*

= 0, that is, /̧m* A. Since M*  TV, it

follows from the lemma that /̧c A; contradiction. So ¸c A < ¸mv A.

On the other hand, suppose ¸mv A and, for reductio, that ¸/c A. From the lemma it follows
that /̧tv A, from which it follows that /̧mv A; contradiction. So ¸mv A < ¸c A.

Hence ¸c A @ ¸mv A.

Proposition 2:

¸c A @

¸mv A.

Proof: The proof proceeds, in all essential respects, like that of Proposition 1.
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Propositions 1 and 2 show that MV semantics retains both classical logic and the classical
theory of deducibility. This appears to answer our first question of whether the sorts of
differences discussed in Section One are inherent in many-valued systems. Since MV semantics
is a many-valued semantics without these differences, such differences cannot be inherent in
many-valued semantics.

Section Three: Discussion

A number of issues call for discussion, the first of which concerns the truth-conditions
found in the semantics of Section Two. Although I am not particularly concerned, in the current
context, with arguing for or against various interpretations of the connectives, and hence with
arguing over truth-conditions, nonetheless some comments on the subject are in order.
First, it is worth noting that given the truth-conditions for MV semantics, there is a sense
in which the set of designated and undesignated truth-values are playing the roles played,
respectively, by 1 and 0 in classical two-valued semantics. This comes through most clearly in
the truth-conditions for negation, but also to an extent in the truth-conditions for the conditional.
In addition, as shown above, MV semantics and classical semantics validate exactly the same
formulas and sanction exactly the same inferences. Given these facts, it might be objected that
MV semantics is not a genuine many-valued semantics, but rather, is more a two-valued
semantics in disguise.
In response to this consideration, in a many-valued context it is important to keep in mind
the notably different roles played by the designated and undesignated values, on the one hand,
and the truth-values on the other. To help illustrate these roles, consider an analogy. With respect
to grading student work, we can separate grades into two sets, passing grades and non-passing
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grades. The distinction between passing and non-passing grades plays certain important roles, for
example, in determining who gets credit for courses, who is categorized as a first year student, a
sophomore, junior or senior, who has earned the right to graduate, and so on. Within the broader
sets of passing and non-passing grades, there are, of course, the individual grades, which play
their own different, yet equally important roles. These roles include determining class rankings,
who graduates with honors, who continues to receive scholarships, who is slated for academic
probation, and so on. And although we separate these individual grades into two sets, the passing
and the non-passing, we would never be tempted to view such a grading system as consisting of
only two grades.
Likewise, in a many-valued semantics, the designated/undesignated values and the
individual truth-values play different roles. The designated/undesignated values are used in
determining which formulas are valid, whether a model simultaneously satisfies a set of
formulas, whether a set of formulas semantically implies a particular sentence, and so on. On the
other hand, in a many-valued context, the idea is to have the individual truth-values play other,
equally important, roles. Depending on the particular semantics, and the intentions of the author
of the semantics, such roles might include enabling the semantics to reflect that robins are more
paradigmatic members of the class of birds than are penguins, that my 20-year-old single nephew
is a more central example of a bachelor than is the Pope, that the sentence "grass is green" is true
to a greater degree than is "the color of the cover of Hardin's Color for Philosophers is green,"
and so on. In short, the designated/undesignated values play an important role distinct from the
role played by the individual truth-values. And just as we would never be led to view a typical
grading system as really consisting of only two grades, there is no reason to consider a system
such as MV semantics to be two-valued.
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Similar considerations hold with respect to the fact that MV semantics and classical
semantics validate exactly the same formulas and sanction exactly the same inferences. The
formulas validated, and the inferences sanctioned, are certainly two important characteristics of a
system. But they are not the only important characteristics. As indicated above, other
characteristics–for example, whether a semantics can reflect facts such as that some individuals
are members of a class to a greater degree than are other individuals–are also important. In fact,
with respect to many-valued systems, these latter characteristics are often viewed as the more
central characteristics. So although MV semantics and classical semantics share some
characteristics, they fail to share other important characteristics, and thus MV semantics is not
merely classical semantics in disguise.
This, then, firms up our answer from the end of Section Two: MV semantics is a manyvalued semantics not having the sorts of differences discussed in the first section, and so clearly
such differences cannot be inherent in many-valued systems. This leads us to our next main
question, concerning the source of these differences.

Section Four: The Source of the Differences

In many-valued systems, intuitions concerning the appropriate truth-conditions for
disjunction and conjunction are the most widely agreed on. In particular, there is general
agreement that a disjunction should take the maximum value of the disjuncts, while a
conjunction should take the minimum value of the conjuncts.
For various reasons, some of which are discussed more below, the quantifiers are
somewhat more problematic. But in general, the following condition on universally quantified
formulas is intuitively appealing:
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~xA[x]

m

 Des if A[t]

~xA[x]

m

Õ Des otherwise,

m

 Des for all t  T

while similar intuitions suggest the following condition on existentially quantified formulas:
}xA[x]

m

 Des if A[t]

}xA[x]

m

Õ Des otherwise.

m

 Des for some t  T

In finitely-valued systems, universally quantified formulas generally take the minimum
value of the formulas gotten by substituting terms for the variable in question, and existentially
quantified formulas generally take the maximum value of such substitutions. As should be clear,
such systems respect the conditions above. Such is not the case for typical infinite-valued
systems, in which universally quantified formulas generally take the glb, and existentially
quantified formulas take the lub, of the formulas gotten by substituting terms for the variable in
question. Such systems do not respect the above conditions, and this is a point to which I will
return in Section Five.
For the sake of convenience, let us call the above conditions on disjunction, conjunction,
and the quantifiers the standard conditions. Again, the intuitions underlying these conditions are
widespread, and even in the few systems (e.g., infinite-valued systems) that do not respect all of
them, it is more likely that the failure is due to the fact that such systems cannot, in any natural
way, respect the conditions (again, more on this in Section Five) rather than any disagreement
with the intuitions.
Where we find the greatest variability in many-valued intuitions is in the truth-conditions
for negation and for the conditional. As such, a more thorough discussion of these connectives is
in order.
In many-valued semantics, two forms of negation are typically distinguished, these being
choice negation and exclusion negation (sometimes referred to as "internal/external" or
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"word/sentence" negation). Consider a sentence such as 'the shirt is green.' The idea behind
choice negation is that the negation operator "attaches" to the predicate in question, such that the
sentence is best interpreted as 'the shirt is not-green.' Such a sentence is generally considered true
to the degree that the object is a member of the anti-extension of the predicate in question. For
example, if the shirt in question is a member of the class "green" to degree .8, then 'the shirt is
not green' is true to degree .2. In general, many-valued systems with the following truthcondition for negation can be considered to be employing choice negation:
~A

m

=1- A

m

In contrast, in exclusion negation, the negation operator ranges over the entire sentence,
so that the sentence would properly be read as 'not (the shirt is green)'. Often, in systems
employing exclusion negation, such a sentence is considered absolutely true if the object is not a
member of the extension of the predicate, and absolutely false if the object is a member of the
extension of the predicate. More generally, we can consider many-valued systems that respect the
following condition to be employing exclusion negation:
~A

m

 Des if A

~A

m

Õ Des otherwise.

m

Õ Des;

(It is worth mentioning that choice and exclusion negation are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. For example, an infinite-valued semantics in which Tru = [0,1] - {.5} could employ
choice negation and still respect the condition on exclusion negation. A four-valued system in
which Tru = {0, .25, .75, 1} could do likewise. However, in typical many-valued semantics, and
in particular, any many-valued semantics whose range of truth-conditions include .5, choice
negation and exclusion negation will be mutually exclusive.)
As mentioned, I am not here particularly interested in arguing for or against various
interpretations of the connectives. However, I do want to make one brief point about choice and
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exclusion negation. It is clear that both forms of negation are found in ordinary discourse, and a
many-valued semantics interested in reflecting (at least some of) the nuances of natural language
ought to reflect this fact. It is worth noting that in the development of a typical semantics, the
negation operator is usually presented as a sentential operator. Interpreted as such, the negation
operator would most naturally be viewed as ranging over the sentence in question, and this
speaks in favor of interpreting the negation operator in terms of exclusion negation.
Choice negation, on the other hand, acts on the predicate in question. As such, choice
negation acts more like a predicate modifier, in the same way that 'almost' acts as a predicate
modifier in the sentence 'Sara is almost tall'. Lakoff (1973) has proposed a straightforward and
natural way of incorporating predicate modifiers into many-valued semantics. Using 'almost' as
an example, the idea is to let this modifier "broaden" the extension of the predicate in question. If
'Sara is tall' is true, say, to degree .6, the effect of the modifier is that 'Sara is almost tall' comes
out true to some appropriately greater degree, say .8. As mentioned, Lakoff has shown how
straightforwardly to incorporate this idea into a many-valued semantics. Since choice negation
behaves as a predicate modifier, the natural treatment would be along the lines suggested by
Lakoff. The idea would be to let choice negation in effect flip the extension of the predicate in
question, the effect being that if 'Sara is tall' is true to degree .6, then 'Sara is not tall' (where 'not'
is treated in its choice sense and as a predicate modifier) is true to degree .4.
To summarize this idea, it seems most natural to interpret the negation operator as
exclusion negation, as is done in MV semantics (and a number of other many-valued systems as
well). Then, if the author of a semantics wishes to extend it to reflect more of the nuances of
natural language, choice negation can straightforwardly be incorporated as a predicate modifier.
Let me turn now to the interpretation of the conditional in many-valued semantics. The
debate over the "correct" interpretation of the conditional goes back at least to the ancient
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Greeks, the principal players in the debate being Philo, on the one hand, and Diodorus on the
other2. Philo argued, in essence, for the most "generous" interpretation of the conditional. In
particular, a conditional should be true in any case where the antecedent is false or the
consequent is true. The most natural way to extend this generous interpretation of the conditional
to many-valued cases would be to say that a conditional should receive a designated value in any
case where the antecedent is undesignated or the consequent designated. Along these lines, say
that a semantics employs a Philonian conditional if the truth-condition for the conditional meets
the following requirement:
AB

m

 Des if A

AB

m

Õ Des otherwise.

m

Õ Des or B

m

 Des

As is probably clear, MV semantics employs a Philonian conditional. Although some
other previously-presented many-valued semantics do as well, the majority of many-valued
systems employ a non-Philonian conditional.
Now, with these points about exclusion/choice negation and the Philonian conditional in
place, we are in a position to present the following proposition.

Proposition 3: Let S be any semantics that respects the standard conditions for
disjunction, conjunction, and the quantifiers. Then employing exclusion negation and a
Philonian conditional are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for S to retain both
classical logic and the classical theory of deducibility.

Proof:
Suppose S does not employ exclusion negation. There are two cases to consider.
Case (i): A

m

Õ Des and ~A

m

Õ Des. Then A v ~A

m

Õ Des, so /̧s A v ~A.
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Case (ii): A

m

 Des and ~A

such that B

m

Õ Des. Then A & ~A /̧s B.

m

 Des. Then A & ~ A

m

 Des. Let B be any formula

So employing exclusion negation is necessary for S to retain both classical logic and the
classical theory of deducibility.

Next, suppose S does not employ a Philonian conditional. There are three cases.
Case (i): A

m

Õ Des and A  B

Case (ii): B

m

 Des and A  B

Case (iii): A

m

 Des, B

m

m

m

Õ Des. Then (A  B) v A

m

Õ Des, so /̧s (A  B) v A.

Õ Des. Then B /̧s A  B.

Õ Des, and A  B

m

 Des. Then A  B, A /̧s B.

So employing a Philonian conditional is likewise necessary for S to retain both classical
logic and the classical theory of deducibility.

Finally, suppose S does employ both exclusion negation and a Philonian conditional. The
proof that this is sufficient to retain both classical logic and the classical theory of
deducibility proceeds much like that of Proposition 1. First, note that a similar lemma
will hold. In particular, where S* is the subset of models for which Tru = {0,1}, ¸c A @ ¸s*
A. Now, suppose ¸c A and, for reductio, that /̧s A. Then for some model M  S, A

m

Õ

Des. Specify a two-valued model M* = D,Q*,{0,1},{1} where Q* is such that (i) for each
t  T, Q*(t) = Q(t), (ii) for each P  P0, Q*(P) = 1 if Q(P)  Des, and Q*(P) = 0 otherwise,
and (iii) for each P  Pn and t1,...,tn  T, Q*(P) = 5, where 5:Dn  {0,1} is such that
5(Q*(t1),...,Q*(tn)) = 1 if Q(P)(Q(t1),...,Q(tn))  Des, and 5(Q*(t1),...,Q*(tn)) = 0 otherwise. A
straightforward induction will show that A

m*

=0@ A

m

Õ Des, so /̧s* A and thus, from

the lemma, /̧c A; contradiction. So ¸c A < ¸s A. On the other hand, suppose ¸s A and, for
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reductio, that /̧cA. From the lemma it follows that /̧s* A, and thus /̧s A; contradiction. So
¸s A < ¸c A, and hence ¸s A @ ¸c A. A similar proof shows that

¸c A @

¸s A.

Thus, employing exclusion negation and a Philonian conditional are individually
necessary and jointly sufficient for S to retain both classical logic and the classical theory
of deducibility.

Proposition 3, then, firms up the answer to the other main question of this paper, namely,
the question as to the source of the differences discussed in Section One. As Proposition 3
shows, any semantics that fails to employ either exclusion negation or a Philonian conditional
cannot retain both classical logic and the classical theory of deducibility. In contrast, any
semantics that respects the standard conditions on disjunction, conjunction, and the quantifiers,
and that employs exclusion negation and a Philonian conditional, will retain both classical logic
and the classical theory of deducibility.

Section Five: Fuzzy Logics

With the above discussions in place, some issues concerning fuzzy logics can be clarified.
Fuzzy logics, as with typical many-valued logics, are generally presented as semantic systems,
albeit semantic systems with infinitely-many truth values. Typically, in infinite-valued systems,
Tru = [0,1]. Such semantics would include earlier infinite-valued systems, such as that of
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Lukasiewicz and Tarski (1930), or the more recent infinite-valued semantics based on fuzzy set
theory, for example, those discussed in Zadeh (1975).
We know from Proposition 3 that if a semantics, including an infinite-valued semantics,
respects the standard conditions for conjunction and disjunction, and employs exclusion negation
and a Philonian conditional, then any failure of that semantics to retain both classical logic and
the classical theory of deducibility will not be due to the truth conditions for these connectives.
What of the quantifiers? In most infinite-valued systems studied to date, including the
systems mentioned above, the truth-conditions for the quantifiers are as follows:
~xA[x]

m

= glb{ A[t]

m

t  T}

}xA[x]

m

= lub{ A[t]

m

t  T}

Call these the typical quantifier conditions for infinite-valued semantics.

Proposition 4: Let IV be any infinite-valued semantics that respects the standard
conditions for conjunction and disjunction, and that employs exclusion negation and a
Philonian conditional. If IV employs the typical quantifier conditions for infinite-valued
semantics, then IV can retain neither classical logic nor the classical theory of
deducibility.

Proof: Let Des = [n,1] (n > 0). (The proof is easily modified for the case where
Des = (n,1]). Let P be a one-place predicate, and M = D,Q,Tru,Des be a model where
Q(P) = 5, such that for each ti  T, 5(ti) = max{0 , n - 1/i}. Then lub{ Pti
so }xPx

m

= n, and thus }xPx

m

 Des. Note that for all ti  T, Pti

employs exclusion negation, we know that for all ti  T, ~Pti

m

m

m

ti  T} = n,

Õ Des. Since IV

 Des, thus for all
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ti  T, ~Pti
~x~Px

m

m

 n. So glb{ ~Pti

m

 Des, and so ~~x~Px

ti  T}  n, and hence ~x~Px
m

m

 n. That is,

Õ Des. So }xPx /̧iv ~~x~Px.

Likewise, since IV employs a Philonian conditional, }xPx  ~~x~Px

m

Õ Des.

Hence /̧iv }xPx  ~~x~Px.

So IV retains neither classical logic nor the classical theory of deducibility.

In short, an infinite-valued semantics that employs the typical quantifier conditions for
infinite-valued systems cannot retain both classical logic and the classical theory of deducibility.3
As a brief aside, and to make note of a point that does not seem to have been discussed in
the literature, the failure of the typical infinite-valued semantics studied to date to respect the
standard conditions on the quantifiers seems an intuitively unappealing feature of such systems.
That is, it is difficult to justify truth-conditions that allow an existentially-quantified formula to
receive a designated value even though every formula gotten by substituting terms for the
variable in question receives an undesignated value. Likewise, it is equally difficult to justify
having a universally quantified formula receive an undesignated value even though every
formula gotten by substituting terms for the variable in question receives a designated value.
This, incidentally, goes some way toward explaining why the semantics of Section Two required
the set of truth-values to be finite–such a requirement was the most straightforward way of
respecting the standard conditions on the quantifiers.
Proposition 4 shows that any infinite-valued semantics that employs the typical quantifier
conditions for infinite-valued semantics cannot retain both classical logic and the classical theory
of deducibility. However, it is perfectly straightforward to construct infinite-valued semantics
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that do retain both. To give one example among many, consider a system in which the truthvalues consist of the reals in the interval [0,1], but excluding .5, that is, Tru = [0,1] - {.5}, and let
Des = (.5,1].4 The truth-values for the quantifiers can be similar to the typical quantifier
conditions for infinite-valued semantics, but modified in some appropriate manner to handle the
cases involving .5. The truth-conditions for the universal quantifier might be, for example,
~xA[x]

m

= .51 if glb{ A[t]

~xA[x]

m

= glb{ A[t]

m

m

t  T} = .5

t  T} otherwise,

while the conditions for the existential quantifier might be
}xA[x]

m

= .49 if lub{ A[t]

}xA[x]

m

= lub{ A[t]

m

m

t  T} = .5

t  T} otherwise.

(The values .51 and .49, as used in these truth-conditions, are of course somewhat arbitrary, and
any number of other values would work as well.) It is easy to see that such a system will respect
the standard conditions on the quantifiers, in spite of employing an infinity of truth-values. Thus,
so long as such a system respects the standard conditions for disjunction and conjunction, and
employs exclusion negation and a Philonian conditional, then Proposition 3 guarantees that the
system will retain both classical logic and the classical theory of deducibility.
So the failure of the infinite-valued systems studied to date to retain both classical logic
and the classical theory of deducibility should not be taken to suggest that such differences are
inherent in infinite-valued systems. Rather, as Proposition 4 shows, the quantifier conditions
typically used in previously-presented infinite-valued systems do not respect the standard
conditions on the quantifiers. And this, at bottom (along perhaps with the truth-conditions for
negation and the conditional, as shown in Proposition 3), is the reason the best-known infinitevalued systems do not retain classical logic and the classical theory of deducibility.
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One final note: the above discussion shows that it is possible to have infinite-valued
semantics that are axiomatizable, contrary to what has sometimes been suggested.5 For example,
any infinite-valued system that respects the standard conditions for conjunction, disjunction, and
the quantifiers, and that employs exclusion negation and a Philonian conditional, will validate
exactly the classically-valid formulas and so of course will be axiomatizable. Thus, we likewise
see that the inability to axiomatize the typical infinite-valued semantics studied to date does not
stem from the infinity of truth values employed.

Section Six: Conclusion

This, then, completes the answers to the main questions of this paper. The answer to our
first question, whether differences between classical and many-valued semantics are inherent in
many-valued systems, was negative. As we saw in Section Two, it is not difficult to specify a
many-valued system that validates all and only the classically valid formulas while at the same
time sanctioning exactly the same inferences as those sanctioned by classical logic.
Our second main question concerned the source of the differences. We saw in Section
Four that if a many-valued system respects the standard conditions for disjunction, conjunction,
and the quantifiers, then employing exclusion negation and a Philonian conditional are
individually necessary and jointly sufficient for that semantics to retain both classical logic and
the classical theory of deducibility. Thus for such a system (that is, one respecting the standard
conditions on disjunction, conjunction, and the quantifiers), a failure to retain classical logic or
the classical theory of deducibility stems from the truth conditions for negation and/or the
conditional.
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Although the results of Section Four hold for both finitely-valued and infinite-valued
systems, some issues involving the better-known infinite-valued systems make it worthwhile to
discuss such systems separately. In particular, as noted in Section Five, the infinite-valued
systems studied to date do not respect the standard conditions for the quantifiers. As Proposition
4 shows, the quantifier conditions used in the best-known infinite-valued systems are themselves
sufficient to prevent such systems from retaining either classical logic or the classical theory of
deducibility, even if exclusion negation and a Philonian conditional are used.
However, we saw at the end of Section Five that it is not difficult to specify an infinitevalued system that does respect the standard conditions for the quantifiers. Thus, so long as such
a system employs exclusion negation and a Philonian conditional (as well as the standard
conditions for disjunction and conjunction), then the system will validate exactly the classically
valid formulas while also retaining the classical theory of deducibility (and so, of course, any
such infinite-valued system would also be axiomatizable).
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1.

Details on many of the systems discussed in this section can be found in Rescher (1969).

2.

See Kneale and Kneale (1962) for further elaboration.

3.

My original notes for this paper were lost some years ago as a result of a fire. But if
memory serves me correctly, the key idea in the proof of Proposition 4 of letting
5(ti) = max{0 , n - 1/i}, or at least an idea similar to this, was first suggested to me by
Stewart Shapiro.

4.

A similar example is noted by Morgan and Pelletier (1977).

5.

For example, Morgan and Pelletier (1977) claim this, citing Scarpellini (1962) as a
source.

